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THE CASE OF THE CONFUSED GIVER
JOSEPH HAWLEY MURPHYt
'Cheshire-Puss,' she began, rather timidly, as she did not
know at all whether it would like the name; however, it only
grinned a little wider. 'Come, it's pleased so far,' thought
Alice, and she went on: 'Would you tell me, please, which
way I ought to go from here?'
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,'
said the cat.
'I don't much care where--' said Alice.
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the cat.
'-so long as I get somewhere,' Alice added as an expla-
nation.
'Oh, you're sure to do that,' said the cat, 'if you only walk
long enough.'
The author of this delightful little colloquy was a professor of
mathematics at Oxford, by real name Charles L. Dodgson, but
immortally remembered as the Lewis Carroll of Alice in Wonder-
land. He wrote in a vein of htmor to the eternal pleasure of
little children, mostly girls, but with a note of satire which
probably delighted such of their parents as were au courant of
the political and social foibles of the day. Dehors the satire, and
viewed from the adult standpoint, it was, however, pure nonsense.
But is it much different from the sort of thing a serious estate
planner is obliged, from time to time, to hand out to an inquiring
client? Take, for example, the field of inter vivos trust giving.
The following dialogue might well take place today:
'Counselor,' says the client, 'I'm in the high income and
estate tax brackets. I have three minor children. My wife
is dead. I'm interested in saving taxes. How about it?'
'Well,' says the lawyer, perhaps even grinning like the
Cheshire Cat, 'have you thought of giving some of your
wealth to your children?'
'I've given some thought to it, but the Government hits
you with a gift tax, doesn't it?'
'Yes,' says the advisor, 'but gift tax rates are lower than
estate tax rates and, what's more important, you can play
the one off against the other and take advantage of lower
brackets and combined exemptions. Furthermore, you save
income taxes.'
t Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University.
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'That's something,' answers the client, 'but, my children
are young. I don't want to turn over any great wealth to
them at their ages. You can understand that.'
'Then why not try a gift in trust? They won't be able to
fritter that away.'
'Can you set up a trust which will give them income until
they reach majority or later and then, perhaps, in my dis-
cretion, turn the principal over to them?'
'Suppose they died before the principal was paid over?'
'Then I'd want the money back. And, of course, since the
bulk of my wealth is tied up in my own corporation, I'd have
to have voting control of the stock.'
'Well, you're getting into deep waters, now.'
'But, counsellor,' asks the client, 'Why can't we do this?
Set up a trust for the kids, with me as trustee. Pay them the
income until they come of age and then turn the principal
over to them, if I feel they're able to handle it. If not, keep
on paying them the income, unless one goes completely sour.
Then, of course, I'd want to cut him off entirely. If I haven't
turned the principal over to them by the time I die, they can
have it then. If any one of them should die before I do, I'd.
want the principal back. What would my taxes be on that
sort of arrangement?'
At this point the lawyer ought to call time out for a look at
the law. If, after examining it, he has the temerity to approach
his prospective client at all, the interview might run about like
this:
'Counsellor,' says the client, 'you've had lots of time to
examine my plan. What about it?'
'Well, it sounds like a good idea, but it won't help you
taxwise.'
'What do you mean? You told me that I'd save money by
giving it away. Isn't that what I'm doing?'
'Well, yes and no.'
'What do you mean by that?'
'You'll pay a gift tax when you create the trusts, but that
probably will not save you income taxes because you'll still
have to pay them on the trust income--'
The client interrupts-'That's not too bad. I'm paying
those anyway.!
'That's not all, however,' continues the lawyer. 'Since the
income is yours, you'll pay a gift tax on it when it is paid
over to the children.'
'That still isn't too bad. It won't be much more than
$3000 apiece each year.'
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'You probably won't get the $3000 exclusion as long as
your children are minors.'
The client settles back in his chair--'At least, I'll save
on death taxes.'
'Probably not, since the principal of the trust will be con-
sidered part of your estate when you die.'
'You mean to say that if I go through with this plan, I'll
have to pay four sets of taxes, while Im only paying two as
things stand now?'
'Well, there are some credits which will reduce your ulti-
mate bill.'
The client rises and puts on his hat. 'Thanks a lot, coun-
sellor. If you'll let me know what I owe you for this advice,
I'll send you a check.'
Unlike our Cheshire Cat, the estate planning counsellor could
not assure the client that if he only walked long enough, he
would get somewhere.
Although it may seem logical to assume that a transfer during
life, so incomplete as to leave its subject matter in the gross
estate of the transferor on his death, should not be regarded as
a complete gift for gift tax purposes, this is not the case. Nor
is the reverse true. Furthermore, how complete a transfer is for
the purpose of gift or estate taxes matters not a whit where the
income tax is concerned. Each seems to have its own criteria of
what constitutes a gift. And none bears any real relation to the
long standing common law concept of a taxable gift.
In short, therefore, words mean nothing, and logical intend-
ment, either of Congress or of the courts, even less. Any attempts
to argue from these points are voices crying out in the wilderness.
As was said by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
At the bottom of respondents' contentions is this implied
assumption: the same transaction cannot be a completed gift
for one purpose and an incomplete gift for another. Of
course, that is not true, as the cases.., make clear. Perhaps
to assuage the feelings and aid the understanding of affected
taxpayers, Congress might use different symbols to describe
the taxable conduct in the several statutes, calling it a 'gift'
in the gift tax law, a 'gaft' in the income tax law, and a
'geft' in the estate tax law.'
In other words, although the federal gift, estate and income
taxes are all part of the same revenue code, and in it the term
1. Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
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"gift" frequently occurs, it does not mean the same thing for all
purposes. It has to be considered in the particular context in
which it appears, complicating the taxpayer's problem beyond
all reason.
THE NATURE OF A GIFT
The answer to the question-what is a gift-should be sim-
plicity itself, and at common law it probably was. Devoid of
legalisms, a gift may be defined as a voluntary transfer, without
consideration or compensation. 2 Its two overriding characteris-
tics are its gratuitous character and a present transfer of its
subject matter.3 Both have been challenged in tax cases.
For purposes of the federal estate tax, transfers made for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth
during the transferor's life are not a part of his gross estate,
whereas their gratuitous counterparts may well be. These
include transfers in contemplation of death, those taking effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after death, those with a life
estate reserved, revocable transfers and joint interests. 4 For
purposes of deduction from the gross estate in arriving at the
net estate, claims based on an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth are allowable.5
The estate tax blends into or, more precisely, collides with the
gift tax at both the points of consideration and transfer. Where
there is no consideration for a transfer it would ordinarily be
considered a gift, subject to the gift tax. However, the element
of transfer is the mark of a gift, and transfers during life which
are brought under the pale of estate tax inclusion are, in most
cases, less than complete. At least they are taxed as substitutes
for testamentary disposition, and the inference should be that
they are less than final.
On the income tax side, there are numerous situations where
it is essential to determine whether a bona fide gift has been
2. Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 72 (1873).
3. Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 100 N.E. 802 (1913). See as
illustrative of some of the problems which confront the common law donor:
Miller v. Silvermann, 247 N.Y. 447, 160 N.E. 910 (1928); Farmer's Loan
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 472, 144 N.E. 769, cert. denied, 266 U.S.
333 (1924); In re Mill's Estate, 172 App. Div. 530, 158 N.Y.Supp. 1100 (1st
Dept.), afifd, 219 N.Y. 642 114 N.E. 1072 (1916); Newman v. Borst 122
N.C. 524, 29 S.E. 848 (1898J ; Hillebrant v. Brewer, 6 Tex. 45 (1891) ; Coch-
rane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 57 (1890).
-4. INT. REV. CODE, §§ 811 (c)-811 (i).
5. INT. REV. CODE, § 812(b).
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made. For example, where property is sold at a gain by one who
has received it as a gift, the basis of that property for the pur-
pose of determining the gain is the cost to the last person who
acquired it by means other than gift. In this connection, the
existence of consideration for the intermediate transfers in-
volved is significant. The presence of a transfer is also important
in dealing with attribution of income. In other words, a transfer
which is not complete or final should not be a sufficient divestiture
to relieve the transferor of income tax liability on the yield of
the property transferred. Typical of this type of situation are
trusts in which the settlor retains various types of controls over
the subject matter. Different answers flow from those previsions
of the Code relating to the income tax consequences of these
dealings than from the equivalent gift or estate tax provisions.
TRUST GIVING
The present federal income tax law made its debut in 1913,6
followed three years later by the federal estate tax.7 Although
in passing the latter Congress was probably motivated by defense
necessities of the moment, longer-range objectives were evident
at the outset. However, the first estate tax law bore little evi-
dence of correlation with the existing income tax law. At the
time, it was probably unnecessary because, in the simplified and
somewhat conceptual approach taken by both, there was little
likelihood of conflict and, accordingly, small reason for cor-
relation.
Nonetheless, the inter vivos gift as a means of evading the
estate tax must have been apprehended by the draftsmen of the
initial estate tax law. They provided that gifts made within
two years of death were deemed in contemplation of death and,
hence, taxable as a part of a decedent's estate." The two-year
limitation was the result of a compromise with advocates of a
provision covering transfers made within four years preceding
death9 That lifetime giving was even then considered a definite
threat to satisfactory estate tax collections was further indicated
by a provision covering jointly owned property in the 1916 Act,1o
6. Tariff Act of 1913, § 13, 38 STAT. 166 (1913).
7. Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 756 (1916).
8. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
9. H.R.Rep. No. 1200, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) (Amendment No.
128), 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 38.
10. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(c), 39 STAT. 778 (1916).
Washington University Open Scholarship
34 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
and one in the 1918 Act including, as part of the gross estate,
gifts taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.11
This legislative awareness of the vitiating effect of inter vivos
giving upon the estate tax had, under the peripheral provisions
described above, manifested itself by way of capturing only those
transfers which were considered as substitutes for testamentary
disposition. Difficult of enforcement, to say nothing of interpre-
tation and administration, they were spotty in the most general
sense. Nothing was done about the out-and-out gift which
smacked in no way of testamentary schemes.
The only realistic approach would seem to be to tax gifts
during life in the same manner and on the same scale as their
death-generated opposite numbers. In 1921 a proposed gift
tax measure had a brief encounter upon the legislative scene.
Gift tax provisions were included in the Revenue Bill of 1921,
laying a tax at graduated rates upon gifts of property in excess
of $20,000 per year. These were passed by the Senate,12 but were
omitted in conference, and failed to become part of the Revenue
Act of 1921.13
In 1924 a clash between Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, a
traditional advocate of low taxes, and then Congressman John
Nance Garner, even at this stage an exponent of the more
revenue-conscious school, brought forth the enactment of the
first gift tax law.' 4 The House Ways and Means Committee had
favored the low tax position of Secretary Mellon, but the Demo-
cratic minority secured House adoption of a higher rate sched-
ule. To protect it, a gift tax law was enacted in mild form,
limited to gifts of over $50,000 in any one year. Although
stricken out by the Finance Committee of the Senate,15 further
debate on the floor resulted in its reinstatement,0 and it became
law on June 2, 1924, as part of the Revenue Act of that year.'7
One noteworthy feature of the first gift tax legislation was the
very clear indication on the part of Congress that this tax was
11. Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 402(b) and (c), 40 STAT. 1097 (1918).
12. 61 CONG. REC. 7485-87 (1921).
13. H.R.Rep. No. 486, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (1921) (Amendment No. 622),
1939-1 CuM. BuLL. (Part 2) 231.
14. Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 CoL. L. Rpv. 773 (1940).
15. Sen. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., ist Sess. (1994), 1939-1 Cutm. BULL.(Part 2) 271.
16. H.R.Rep. No. 844, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (Amendment No. 179),
1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 310.
17. Revenue Act of 1924, § 319 et seq., 43 STAT. 313 (1924).
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intended to supplement and protect the income tax, by preventing
the loss of surtax revenue by the splitting up of large estates.
It was also said to have been designed to prevent the evasion of
estate taxes through lifetime gifts.18
More intrinsic correlation was evident in the latter regard.
The 1924 Act amended the estate tax law to provide a gift tax
credit 9 and extended the prior-taxed property deduction, here-
tofore confined to property which had been the subject of a
previous estate tax, to property which had been the subject of a
gift tax within five years of the death of a decedent. 20 The
graduated rate schedules and the exemptions for the gift tax
were the same as in the case of estate tax rates on testamentary
transfers.21
The 1924 gift tax law was not a popular measure with any-
one, including Congress, from the outset. Even before its enact-
ment, it had been criticized as a further "levy on capital," as
"entirely ineffective" and "impossible of effective administra-
tion.""-2 It was repealed in 192623 with the laconic report, "Its
administrative difficulties are numerous; the revenue return is
small; and it is easily evaded." 24
The necessity for protecting the surtax revenue was appar-
ently completely forgotten with the repeal of the gift tax provi-
sions. But even in death, its correlation with the estate tax
provisions of the revenue system lingered. In 1926, estate tax
rates had been retroactively reduced, and a similar retroactive
reduction was made in the rates of tax on gifts made under the
1924 Act prior to its repeal.25 More significant, however, was the
imposition of a "substitute gift tax" in the form of a more
stringent contemplation of death feature of the law.
It will be recalled that the 1916 Act had contained a rebuttable
presumption that any transfer made within two years of death
18. 65 CONG. REc. 3120, 3172-73, 8095-96 (1924). These are the comments
of Congressman Green (Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee),
Congressman Garner, Senator Walsh and Senator Simmons.
19. Revenue Act of 1924, § 322, 43 STAT. 315-316 (1924).
20. Ibid.
21. See note 17 supra. See also Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 333
(1932) (dissenting opinion of Stone, J.).
22. See note 15 supra.
23. Revenue Act of 1926, § 1200(a), 44 STAT. (Part 2) 125 (1926).
24. Sen. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), 1939-1 Cum. BuLL.
(Part 2) 339.
25. Revenue Act of 1926, § 324(a), 44 STAT. (Part 2) 86-87 (1926).
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was deemed to be in contemplation of death. This had been
continued in the Acts of 1918, 1921 and 1924. It had always
proved very ineffective in practical administration, and the diffi-
culty of its enforcement in the light of the repeal of the gift tax
was felt to be insurmountable. 26 Accordingly, it was replaced
with a conclusive presumption that all gifts within two years of
death were to be considered part of the decedent's estate.27
Retroactive application was denied the 1924 gift tax law in
two decisions,28 in one of which the court split evenly on the
constitutionality of the law itself.29 A later decision laid to rest
any doubts of constitutionality, resolving them in its favor, 6
In still another case, the Government found itself arguing that
no estate tax could be effective without some means of taxing
inter vivos transfers made to evade it, that no one expected any
revenue from the gift tax, and that it would supplement the
estate tax, making the latter effective. 31 Mr. Justice Brandeis
espoused this approach in a dissenting opinion and added what
had, for all practical purposes been by-passed for some time,
namely that the evasion of the income tax was also curtailed by
a gift tax measure to discourage the splitting up of large estates32
From this uneventful, albeit somewhat strange, history of the
first gift tax measure, about all that emerge are its potentialities.
It could certainly be an effective counterpoint to the estate tax
law, and it could serve the same purposes insofar as the income
tax is concerned. Its role is one of rescue.33 That was all it was,
and all it would probably ever need to be. But the "Era of
Wonderful Nonsense" was no time to test its effectiveness, and
the tax unconsciousness of the "Roaring Twenties" no stage on
which to expect it to play an effective part. With a balanced
budget and two chickens in every pot, no policeman was needed
for the tax system.
However, when Heiner v. DonnawP4 decided, on March 21,
26. H.R. Rep. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), 1939-1 Cumi. BULL.
(Part 2) 325.
27. Revenue Act of 1926, § 302 (c), 44 STAT. (Part 2) 70 (1926).
28. Untermeyer v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 440 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142 (1927).
29. Blodgett v. Holden 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
30. Bromley v. McCaughan, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
31. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 313 (1932).
32. Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 450 (1928).
33. 2 PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAYxATIo 1056 (1942).
34. See note 31 supra.
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1932, that the conclusive presumption that all gifts made within
two years of death were in contemplation of death violated the
due process requirement, the scenery had been shifted on the
economic stage. Large fortunes and breadlines did not go well
together. The guardians of the revenue decided that, absent a
conclusive presumption with respect to contemplation of death
transfers, a new gift tax law was needed. Furthermore, the
revenue bill contemplated for 1932 increased both income and
estate tax rates. 5
Both sources of the revenue were therefore in need of protec-
tion. The House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate
Finance Committee fell over each other in pointing out that a
gift tax was the needed safeguard. 8 However, mere lip service
was paid to the gift tax as an offset to the income tax. The only
substantial correlation achieved was in the estate-gift tax field.
Graduated rates for the gift tax37 (roughly analogous to the
estate tax rates), a gift tax credit,3s a prior-taxed property de-
duction feature,"' and a return to the contemplation of death
two-year rebuttable presumption40 earmarked the new law.
The approach continued to be unrealistic however. The 1932
gift tax was hardly more of an attempt at correlation with the
estate tax than was its 1924 counterpart. Except for increasing
the cost of lifetime gifts to save income taxes, no more correla-
tion or integration with this tax was present. In fact, the new
tax scheme contained several ludicrous features, which have
remained, in greater or lesser degree, to plague donors at the
present time.
There would seem to be two fundamental approaches to the
problem of lifetime giving. The gift tax is either a protective
shroud, blanketing both the estate and income tax laws, or it is
a measure designed to reach substitutes for testamentary dispo-
sion. These are inconsistent objectives. With the former, there
35. Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 245 (1932).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 Cum. BULL.
(Part 2) 462; Sen. Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 CuM.
BULL. (Part 2) 504; H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1
CuM. BULL (Part 2) 477; Sen. Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1932).
1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 525.
37. Revenue Act of 1932, § 502, 47 STAT. 246 (1932).
38. Revenue Act of 1932, § 801(b), 47 STAT. 278 (1932).
39. Revenue Act of 1932, § 806, 47 STAT. 281 (1932).
40. See note 8 supra.
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is no need for the latter; the latter presupposes that the former
is unnecessary.
To say that the decision of the Supreme Court in Heiner v.
Donnan,4' striking down the conclusive presumption in the con-
templation of death feature of the Estate Tax Law of 1926,
necessitated the enactment of a law taxing all life-time gifts, is
a complete non sequitur. Even though the dissent 42 in that case,
upholding the validity of this approach, is regarded as more
nearly approximating current constitutional concepts, 43 the result
of the majority decision did not require relief so drastic as a
gift tax law. Prior to the gift tax of 1924, the tax system had
contained a mere rebuttable presumption. It had not even been
denounced as ineffective until denunciation became a clich6 for
the repeal of the gift tax.
On the other hand, to enact a gift tax law and, in the same
breath, to restore the admittedly ineffective rebuttable presump-
tion as to contemplation of death, was equally a non sequitur.
The same might be said of the retention, in the estate tax law,
of all of the complicated provisions which sought to reach sub-
stitutes for testamentary disposition.
These provisions deal with jointly held property, transfers in
contemplation of death, transfers taking effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death, transfers with life estates reserved
and revocable transfers. They have been a source of some of
this country's most complicated and self-contradictory litigation.
To tax substitutes for testamentary disposition as part of a
decedent's estate, while still imposing a tax on any lifetime
transfers which he may make, whether they be testamentary in
nature or not, is to impose an unwarranted and undue burden
on both the government and the taxpayer. The result has
approximated chaos.
GIVING AND THE GIFT TAX
The 1924 gift tax law cast no light on what was meant by the
word "gift," and the decisions under it assimilated many of the
common law concepts. These were described as including an
41. See note 31 supra.
42. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 333 (1932).
43. See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 90(1935) : "The test of validity in respect of due process of law is whether the
means adopted are appropriate to the end." See also, Helvering v. Bullard,
303 U.S. 297 (1938); Helvering v. Bowers, 303 U.S. 618 (1938).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss1/6
THE CASE OF THE CONFUSED GIVER
intention to deliver gratuitously and an actual or constructive
delivery. 4" Acceptance by the donee was soon added,45 and, as
time went on, the decisions became more prolix in specifying
the requirements."6
The questions which had plagued the common law courts in
deciding upon the validity of gifts soon confronted the federal
courts in deciding tax cases. It was, for example, decided that
after a gift is completed a donor may retain possession of the
donated property.47 Various types of instruments of gift were
upheld as effective vehicles of transfer, even though the property
itself was not delivered. 8 In this manner, gifts of personal prop-
erty subject to liens or pledges were possible.49 As with the
common law, promises to make gifts in the future were not
upheld for gift tax purposes.-"
However, departures were also making themselves felt. As
might be anticipated, there was an effort on the part of the
Commissioner to get away from subjective elements of giving.
Thus it was pointed out that the mere absence of a legal duty to
pay was not conclusive on the question of a gift.-" More and
more the tax courts sought ritualistic or ceremonial conduct
evincing a relinquishment of control in the donor as being deter-
minative of a gift,52 despite the fact that so-called "symbolic
delivery" had long since ceased to be the true test at common
law.43
With the 1932 Act, some light was cast by the committee
reports on what Congress had in mind when it used the term
"gift" in a gift tax measure. It was pointed out that the words
"property," "transfer," "gift" and "indirectly" were used in their
44. Parrot v. Noel, 8 F.2d 368, 370 (E.D. Va. 1925), r'ev'd, 15 F.2d 669(4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 754 (1927).
45. Estate of David R. Daly, 3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926).
46. Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929); Naomi Towle Bucholz,
13 T.C. 201 (1949); Augustus E. Staley, 41 B.T.A. 752 (1940); Blanche
S. Ross, 28 B.T.A. 39 (1933).
47. Edson v. Lucas, 40 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1930).
48. Kate R. DeForest, 27 B.T.A. 373 (1932).
49. Froley v. Allen, 170 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1948).
50. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 472, 144 N.E. 769,
cert. denied, 266 U.S. 333 (1924).
51. Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1933).
52. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 569 (2d Cir. 1942).
53. 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 216, 221(1st ed. 1947).
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"broadest and most comprehensive" sense.A4 They were designed
to cover and comprehend all transactions to the extent that
property or a property right was donatively passed to or con-
ferred upon another, regardless of the means or the device
employed in the accomplishment. 5
Perusal of the law itself indicates that the tax applies whether
the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct
or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible
or intangible. 6 Some sections of the gift tax law are at direct
variance with common law standards. For example, transfers
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth are treated as gifts, or pro tanto gifts to the
extent that their value exceeds the consideration received. 7
Thus, while some of the common law elements of giving may
be important as determinants of an effective gift for gift tax
purposes, they are by no means conclusive. Perhaps they would
have been had Congress used the term "gift" in its colloquial
sense. The courts chose to find a considerably larger legislative
intent and one, which as indicated above, did not involve the
ascertainment of what was too often an elusive state of mind on
the part of a recalcitrant taxpayer.5 8
Therefore, little help should be sought or expected from state
court opinions based on common law principles. The decisions in
the tax field make the determination dependent upon the circum-
stances surrounding each case,50 the customary functional ap-
proach all too frequently found in fiscal matters. As one court
aptly put it, "We are not here compelled ... to play the role of
ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state.100
THE GIFT IN TRUST
Nowhere is the failure to integrate or correlate the income,
estate and gift taxes more evident than in the area of trust
giving. As previously noted, a lifetime transfer may well result
54. H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 Cum. BuLL.(Part 2) 476; Sen. Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 Cum.
BULL. (Part 2) 524.
55. Ibid.
56. INT. REV. CODE § 1000 (b).
57. INT. Rav. CoDE § 1002; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §§ 86.1, 86.8 (1940).
58. Commissioner v. Weymss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
59. Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 221, 223 (9th Cir. 1949).
60. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1949).
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in the transferor's paying a gift tax on the subject of the trans-
fer, an income tax on its yield, another gift tax on the income
turned over to the beneficiary, and, finally, an estate tax on the
subject matter of the trust. While the gift tax credit and the
prior-taxed property deduction may afford a measure of relief
from the estate tax, there is no such relief with respect to the
income tax. Even in the estate tax, the relief given is inadequate
and extremely difficult of ascertainment. A scheme of taxation
which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to predict the tax
incidents of a transaction at its inception is hardly satisfactory.
TRUST GIVING AND THE GIFT TAx
Earlier decisions took the position, quite logical in itself, that
the mere failure to deprive the settlor of all the benefits upon
a purported transfer would not mean that it would not be con-
sidered a taxable gift.61 However, a line of authority soon devel-
oped which indicated, with some reservations, that the basic
purpose of the gift tax law was to tax transfers that had been
consummated.62 Under this theory, a transfer was not consum-
mated until it had been put beyond recall. Thus, trust deeds
containing a power of revocation were not completed gifts until
these powers had been relinquished. 6'3
Such decisions as this found a legislative intent that the gift
and estate tax laws should be considered in pan nuteria. Their
rationale was applied to a situation in which a settlor had re-
served the power to alter a disposition previously made.6 4 They
were not followed, however, where a reversion remained in a
settlor by operation of law. 5 At this point there was anything
but crystal clarity in the field, and the need for definitive decision
was paramount.
Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner" and Rasquin v. Hum-
phreys,'-7 represent the best, and perhaps the last, efforts of the
Supreme Court to achieve integration or correlation in the field
61. E.g., Bingham v. White, 31 F.2d 574 (D.C. Alass. 1929).
62. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933).
63. Ibid.
64. Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 756
(1937).
65. Hughes v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1939). See also Orrin
G. Wood, 40 B.T.A. 905 (1939).
66. 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
67. Id. at 54.
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of trust giving. Both involved lifetime transfers of property it
trust, with the reservation of the power to designate new bene-
ficiaries other than the settlor. In both it was held that the gift
was incomplete until the reserved power had been relinquished.
The decisions were bottomed on the proposition that the gift tax
supplemented the estate tax, and that Congress could not have
intended to tax as gifts transfers which were so incomplete as
to be subject to an estate tax.
The logic of this reasoning seems inescapable, but shreds of
doubt remained. The Supreme Court had to concede that the two
taxes were not always mutually exclusive; otherwise it would
have been compelled to ignore entirely the gift tax credit and the
contemplation of death features of the estate tax law. It had
difficulty in handling both and had virtually to concede lack of
correlation in the contemplation of death field. However, with
respect to other transfers, which under the estate tax law were
regarded as substitutes for testamentary disposition, it stated
quite forcibly that two taxes could not have been contemplated
upon the same transaction.
TRUST GIVING AND THE ESTATE TAX
The Sanford and Rasquin cases were less than a year old when
the Hallock68 case was decided by the Supreme Court. Prior to
this decision there was an aura of doubt as to the extent to which
a settlor need divest himself of control in a lifetime transfer
to absolve his estate of death taxes on the subject matter of
the transfer. The Hallock case resolved the doubt in favor of
inclusion.
The effect of the Hallock case was to include as a part of the
gross estate any transfer which was not immediate, out-and-out,
and entirely unaffected by the subsequent death of the settlor.
In other words, if, in creating a living trust the settlor retained
any present legal title, or any right to possess or enjoy the
property then or thereafter, the transfer was not complete for
estate tax purposes.
ESTATE VIS-A-VIS GIFT TAXES
If the HallocW case was a bitter pill for taxpayers to swallow,
it was, perhaps, even more bitter for the Commissioner and the
68. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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courts in gift tax cases. There they would be confronted with the
taxpayer's contention that, since the merest string was retained,
the gift was not complete under the Hallock rationale and hence,
not taxable under the Sanford and Rasquin cases. But the reten-
tion of the merest string, such as, for example, a reversion, as in
the Halock-type case, was a good deal less than reserving a
power to designate new beneficiaries, as in the Sanford and
Rasquin decisions. Should anything so slight be permitted to
defeat the Government's claim for revenue from what was other-
wise a complete transfer?
Some courts hewed to the line laid down by the Sanford and
Rasquin decisions and refused to regard the gift as being
complete, even where the merest expectancy had been retained.69
There was even indication, by way of the purest dicta, that the
Supreme Court itself might go along on this proposition.70
However, other courts choked at so slight an interest depriving
the Government of its gift tax due. Some frankly admitted that
double taxation was involved.7'1 Others used weasel words, seek-
ing to distinguish between an expectancy capable of resolution by
the donor himself during life-the Sanford situation-and an ex-
pectancy which is resolved by the grim reaper mowing down the
potential remaindermen before the death of the donor-analo-
gous to Hallock.72 A realistic few admitted that the problem was
too much for them, and called upon Congress and the Supreme
Court for relief.73
The Supreme Court answered the call, but in a tone of voice
which might better have been used by its legislative fellows. In
Smith v. Shaughnessy74 a seventy-two year old settlor made an
irrevocable transfer of over half a million dollars in securities,
the income to go to his forty-four year old wife for life. Should
she predecease him, the securities were to be returned to him; if
not, as she by will directed, and, in default, to her intestate suc-
69. Emily Trevor, 40 B.T.A. 1241 (1939).
70. "A gift to a trustee reserving to the donor the economic benefit of the
trust or the power of its disposition involves no taxable gift." Helvering
v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 396 (1941).
71. Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
72. Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1942).
73. Commissioner v. McLean, 127 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942); Higgins v.
Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942).
74. 318 U.S. 176 (1943), affirming and modifying, 128 F.2d 742 (2d Cir.
1942), reversing, 40 F. Supp. 19 (N.D.N.Y. 1941).
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cessors under New York law. A gift tax was paid on the property
transferred. Since it seemed apparent, under the Hallock decision
that the proceeds of this trust must be included in the settlor's
estate at death, a refund of the gift tax was sought.
The district court held that a completed gift had been made
of the life estate, but not of the remainder. The court of appeals
reversed and dismissed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of alleged conflict between the Sanford and Hallock cases.
Before that Court it was conceded that the life estate was subject
to the gift tax and that the reversionary interest in the settlor
was not. The taxpayer argued that, since the Hallock decision
would tax the corpus as part of the gross estate, it could not also
be taxed as a lifetime gift, since the Sanford case had intimated
a general policy against allowing the same property to be taxed
as a gift and also as part of the estate.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the
remainder was taxable as a gift. The taxpayer, it was said, had
misunderstood the Sanford case, which had quite clearly stated
that the gift and estate taxes were not always mutually exclusive.
The Court then proceeded to develop the so-called "down-pay-
ment" test, pointing out that in some cases the payment of the
gift tax was in the nature of earnest money, to secure the event-
ual payment of the estate tax. It also looked with favor upon
the dubious distinction made by the lower courts between a
transfer reserving rights which could be exercised by the donor
during his life and one in which the only question was who
should die first.
Conflicting claims of taxability often produce strange and un-
intended results. Nowhere is this more evident than in the cases
under consideration. The Hallock rule has had every ounce of
persuasion contained in it utilized by the Commissioner to tax
transfers in which the slightest string has been reserved. This
was accomplished first by the Hallock Regulations," and, as if
they did not go far enough, by the impetus contained in the
Church-Spiegel decisions-6 of the Supreme Court. These latter
decisions extended the doctrine to what, it developed, was the
75. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §§ 81.17, 81.18 and 81.19 (1939), as amended
by T.D. 5741, approved Sept. 6, 1949.
76. Commissioner v. Estate of F.L.Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Estate
of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss1/6
THE CASE OF THE CONFUSED GIVER
Congressional breaking point, by holding that a possibility of
reverter arising by operation of law met the "slightest string"
test of the Hallock decision. Following the Treasury regulations
issued under these cases,'77 there was no doubt but that a gift had
to be a complete divestiture, in every sense, to avert estate tax
includibility.
The gift tax did not keep pace. Perhaps it need not have done
so, for the doom of integration and correlation had been sealed
by the Smith case. If any question remained, its companion,
Robinette v. Helvering," answered it by holding that a reversion-
ary interest, existing by operation of law and incapable of
actuarial valuation, but one that nonetheless would result in
estate tax includibility under the Spiegel case, was not sufficient
to impede a completed gift of the remainder. The mandate of
these cases was clear, if not coherent, and a ready answer to the
argument of double inclusion was at hand. Courts no longer need
trouble themselves with double inclusion, correlation or integra-
tion. It was inherent in the expressions of the Supreme Court
that transfers in trust could be subjected to an immediate gift
tax despite the retention of an interest which would also subject
them to the estate tax.1 It was no answer either way to argue
that the transfer was covered by another tax. 0
Congress has, it is true, somewhat ameliorated the strict inter-
pretation of the Hallock case. The Technical Changes Act of 1949
dealt with the troublesome question of reversions."' As to pre-
October 7, 1949 transfers, the reversion must be express and
must exceed in value more than five per cent of the property
transferred. Post-October 7, 1949 transfers are now guided by
a definition of what is meant by a transfer taking effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death. Survivorship of the
settlor is evidently the sole test. Although the law may have
helped the taxpayer in the Smith case, a result dependent on the
77. See note 74 supra.
78. 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
79. Estate of Lester Field, 2 T.C. 21 (1943), rev'd, Field v. Commissioner,
144 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd and Tax Court aff'd, 324 U.S. 113 (1945).
80. Daisy B. Plummer, 2 T.C. 263 (1943); Commissioner v. Proctor, 142
F.2d 824 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied, 142 F.2d 828 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 756 (1944), further hearing 4 T.C.M. 359, aff'd, 151 F.2d 603 (4th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 785 (1946).
81. INT. REv. CoDE § 811(c) as amended by Publ. L. 378, 81st Cong., 1st
Seas., § 7 (Oct. 25, 1949).
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actuarial valuation of the various interests involved, it has
afforded no solution to the problem. In effect, it may have cut
down what may be included in a decedent's gross estate. It did
not bring gift tax concepts up to that level.
TRUST GIVING AND THE INCOME TAX
The problem in this field involves those trusts in which for one
reason or another the income, although payable to beneficiaries
other than the settlor, remains taxable to him. The enactment of
Section 166 of the Code, taxing the income of a revocable trust
to its grantor, and Section 167, taxing the grantor where the
income may be used for his benefit, introduced the problem. It
did not become acute until it was decided in Helvering v.
Clifford,82 and further amplified in Helvering v. Stuart,83 that
these sections were not the only criteria by which the income of
a trust could be taxed to the settlor. The broad language of
Section 22, defining income itself, could be employed to tax to the
grantor the income from a trust, not covered by Section 166 or
167, where the economic benefits of the income were enjoyed by
the grantor, although the income itself was not received by him.
The manifestations and expectations of the Treasury as to its
new found powers under the Clifford case were embodied in the
so-called "Clifford Regulations,"'' issued under Section 22. In-
ordinately complicated, they laid down three general tests for
taxing income of a trust to the settlor-reversion after a rela-
tively short term, right to disposition of beneficial enjoyment of
corpus or income, and retention of administrative controls over
corpus or income. If any of these tests were met, the income from
the trust could be taxed to the grantor.
Even this brief survey of the Clifford tests probably indicates
that they are not the same as those applied to determine the
includibility of the corpus of a living trust in the estate of the
grantor for estate tax purposes. There is respectable authority
for the conclusion that a Clifford-type trust is not, ipso facto,
included in the gross estate of its creator.85 However, no one can
82. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
83. 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
84. U.S. Treas. Regs. 111, §§ 29.22(a)-21, 29.22(a)-22 (1943). See also,Alexandre, A Case Method Restatement of the New Clifford Regulations,
3 TAx L. Rav. 189 (1948).
85. See, Greenbaum, Is the Clifford Concept Applicable for Estate and
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gainsay that there may be areas in which the two will overlap.
Where they do, could the argument be made that, since the in-
come remains taxable to the grantor and the corpus will be
included in his gross estate, he should not be subject to the
gift tax when he makes the transfer in trust? Or, disregarding
all questions of whether, because a trust is of the Clifford-type,
it is includible in the settlor's estate, could it be argued that
merely because the income remains taxable to the grantor, the
gift cannot be complete enough to justify a gift tax on the
creation of the trust?
Unfortunately, Clifford-type trusts were not in the picture
when the 1924 or 1932 gift tax laws were enacted, so it is not
to be expected that they should have been in the legislative mind
at that time. However, when the problem did arise courts were
reluctant to concede that a gift tax was not payable, even though
the income remained taxable to the grantor under the Clifford
case. In other words, these courts took the view that the gift
tax was not sufficiently integrated with the income tax so that
decisions like the Clifford case, or statutory provisions like Sec-
tions 166 and 167, need be read as holding that no gift tax was
payable upon the creation of the trust. 6 As one court put it,
". any correlation that may exist is purely coincidental. ' ' sT
GIFT TAXES ON INCOME PAYMENTS
Assume that a Section 166, Section 167 or Clifford-type trust
is established. A gift tax is paid and the income remains taxable
to the grantor. However, that income is not paid to the grantor;
it goes to the beneficiaries. Must the grantor pay a gift tax on
the increments of income paid to them? Two cases bear on the
problem.
In Commissioner v. Warner,8 the grantor retained the power
to revest the trust property in himself. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no complete gift of
Gift Tax Purposes?, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL TAXATION 289 (1951).
86. Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942); Com-
missioner v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940).
87. Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948). See also
Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 96 F.Supp. 712
(W.D. Pa. 1951); Commissioner v. Blum, 187 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1951).
88. 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
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the corpus of the trust and that the payments of income to the
beneficiaries amounted to gifts from the settlor.
In Commissioner v. Hogle,89 a stock trading trust was created,
income payable to the settlor's designated beneficiaries, with
the settlor having the power to carry on marginal trading opera-
tions. After litigation, it was held that the income resulting from
the trading was taxable to the grantor. 0 The Commissioner then
asserted that the settlor was liable for a gift tax on the income
accruing to the trusts and paid to the beneficiaries.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to sanction
such a tax. Its reasoning, based upon the feeling that there had
not been a completed gift, was not very persuasive in the absence
of evidence that any strings were attached to the income paid to
the beneficiaries. Perhaps, since the taxpayer had already been
beaten on one point, the Court felt that the Commissioner was
kicking a man when he was down. However, one is inclined to
agree with the writer who commented on the Hogle case with
the words ". . . decisions may come and decisions may go, but
the incongruity goes on forever.""'
CONCLUSION
It is still too early to predict with certainty whether the Com-
missioner will prevail in his attempt to collect the fourth tax in
this situation--i.e., the gift tax upon the income of the Clifford-
type trust, which is paid to the beneficiary but considered income
to the grantor. However, he has attempted to do so and has
convinced at least one court that such a tax could be imposed.
There is little doubt of his ability to collect a gift tax when this
type of trust is set up, and, under some circumstances, he will
be able to assert a tax upon the gross estate of the settlor for
the amount of the corpus of the trust. The argument that such
a result could not possibly be intended or that it is beyond
the wildest dreams of the legislative imagination must fall on
deaf ears.
Nor would an argument addressed to the constitutional aspects
of this dilemma fare any better. It is entirely competent for
Congress to treat certain types of inter vivos transfers as testa-
89. 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947).
90. Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1942).
91. Note, 21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 312 (1948).
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mentary and tax them as such.92 The fact that multiple taxation
may result is no bar to their enforcement. The Supreme Court
has pointed out that double taxation, if clearly the intention of
the Congress, is concededly constitutional and may properly be
collected. 93
A plethora of suggestions for altering this situation have, from
time to time, been advanced. Countless decisions have echoed the
words of the Supreme Court that, "Correlation of the gift and
the estate tax still requires legislative intervention." 94 Proposals
and counter-proposals have been made. Committees have been
appointed and have reported. The Treasury Department has con-
curred as to the necessity for a revision and has acquiesced in a
plan for it. Congress has considered measures granting some
relief. Mark Twain's comment concerning the weather is most
appropriate at this point.
To combine inheritance, income and gift taxes into one single
tax, treating all such acquisitions as, for example, income, might
perhaps seem far-fetched on the basis of our present standards
of tax thinking. However, the Income Tax Act of 1894 taxed
inheritances as income.95 A partial effort at integration was
made in 1938, with a Treasury recommendation that exemptions
under the gift and estate taxes be combined so that they would
be available under the estate tax only to the extent that they had
not been applied against previous gifts. This proposal received
the approval of the Committee on Ways and Means and was
adopted by the House. However, it was eliminated by the Senate
Finance Committee and died in conference.9 6
In 1940, a proposal was made for the integration of the estate
and gift taxes by the imposition of a single, cumulative transfer
tax, much in the nature of the present gift tax with the final
transfer under it being the one made at death.97 The need for
coordination was recognized by other writers in the same year.9 8
92. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
93. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928); King v. United States,
79 F.2d 453, 455 (4th Cir. 1935).
94. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945).
95. Income Tax Act of 1894, 28 STAT, 553 (1894).
96. Sen. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 40 (1938); H.R. Rep. No.
2330, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 49 (1938) (Amendment No. 167).
97. Altman, Integration of the Estate and Gift Taxes, LAw AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 331 (1940).
98. Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 CoL. L. REv. 773 (1940).
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In the next year it was suggested that the income tax be woven
into a single, cumulative transfer tax picture. The underlying
theory would be that where there had been a reservation of
control under existing concepts, there would not be a present
transfer tax, the grantor remaining taxable on the income and
the transfer tax being postponed until his death.00
The failure of the Revenue Act of 1942 to provide any relief
in this situation evoked a number of responses 00 One authority
commented,10' "The law as it now stands is fully beyond the
comprehension of any but experts, and the most that they can
do in many situations is to express doubts." He also proposed
what would seem a fairly workable scheme. All tests of taxability
-income, estate, and gift---would be included in one section, the
writer choosing Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
relates to trusts the income upon which remains taxable to the
grantor. The gift and estate tax section would be then amended
to refer back to the master section. If a transfer were complete
under that section, a gift tax would be immediately payable, but
no prospective income or estate tax liability would attach. If
not thus complete, there would be a gift tax, but the grantor
would continue to be taxable on the income, and the property
would be subject to tax as a part of his estate on his death.
Discussion of the need for reform along streamlined and mod-
ernized lines continues, with writer after writer directing atten-
tion to the existing deficiencies and the pressing need for relief.
10 2
The Treasury Department itself appeared more than willing to
cooperate and a joint advisory committee was designated to work
with its office of the Tax Legislative Counsel on a program. The
result of this carefully considered study was a proposal for a
single transfer tax covering testamentary and inter vivos trans-
fers, eliminating the contemplation of death transfer, imposing
the tax at the point of completed transfer, providing there would
99. Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HAnv. L. REV. 1
(1941).
100. E.g., 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1056 (1942);
Kauper, The Revenue Act of 1942; Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 41
MxCH. L. REV. 369 (1942).
101. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate and
Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV.
L0 R .337 (1942).
102. See, e.g., Eisenstein, Modernizing Estate and Gift Taxes, 24 TAxEs
870 (1946).
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be no tax upon such a transfer until that time and no income tax
to the transferor thereafter, with the test of completeness being
the possibility of actual control.10 3 The plan seemed exceedingly
well thought out and appeared workable, although not above
criticism at some points. 0 4
The Revenue Revision Bill of 1948, far from being an attempt
at correlation or integration in these fields, did stab at a few of
the problems.0- Congress recognized the need for revision, with
at least a tacit admission that the proposed measure fell short
of what was called for 00 The bill was passed by the House, but
was not considered by the Senate prior to adjournment.
On January 23, 1950, President Truman, in his Tax Message
to Congress, indicated that some correlation between the gift and
estate tax was required, not only in the interest of revenue, but
fairness as well. He said:
To strengthen the estate and gift tax laws, several steps are
necessary. The laws concerning the taxation of transfers by
gift and by bequest, by outright disposition and through life
estates, need to be coordinated to provide uniform treatment
and a base for more effective taxation. In addition the pres-
ent exemption should be reduced and the rates should be
revised. These changes will not only bring in more revenue,
but they will improve the fairness of the estate and gift tax
laws and bring these taxes nearer to their proper long term
place in our tax system. 0 7
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder followed this up with detailed
suggestions along the lines of the Joint Advisory Committee
Legislative Counsel's Office Report of 1947.108 Korea threw these
suggestions into the future reference file, but even with the war-
time demands for increased revenue, they have not been for-
gotten.' 9
There is always danger in departing from established stand-
ards. Lawyers, while perhaps denying it, are essentially con-
103. FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs, A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AN
CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME TAX (U.S. Gov't. P.O. 1947).
104. See e.g., Alexander, A Summary of the Treasury's Study in Integra-
tion and Correlation, 25 TAXEs 955 (1947) ; Platt, Integration and Correla-
tion-the Treasury Proposal, 3 TAx L. REV. 59 (1947).
105. H.R. Rep. No. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
106. H.R. Rep. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
107. 37 CCH FE). TAX REP. No. 7 (1950).108. 28 CCH FEDERAL EST. AND GIFT TAX REP. (Part 1) 8 (1950).109. Allusion was made to this problem by the President in his tax recom-
mendations of February 2, 1951, and considerably amplified by Secretary
Snyder before the House Ways and Means Committee on February 5, 1951.
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ceptual thinkers. They can probably render the greatest servic-
to their clients when advising on the basis of precedent. For
this reason, pause is usually given to any schemes which would
work a wholesale revision of income, estate and gift tax laws
along the lines discussed above.
In the area of trust giving, however, the precedent currently
existing is merely confusion. All an estate planner can say to
a client is that he make an out-and-out gift, with no strings at-
tached, pay the gift tax and hope that he live the three years
necessary to bar the Government's contention that the transfer
was in contemplation of death. Even the simplest gifts in trust
may be suspect, and the type of a trust gift to be made for a
minor beneficiary is even more risky. To embark upon the field
of trust giving with reserved powers of any kind is the task of
an expert.
Correlation and integration, however, involve certain sacri-
fices. Among these is the loss of a favorite current pastime-
playing the gift tax against the estate tax, taking advantage of
the annual exclusion of the gift tax and the exemptions of both,
with the added incentive of the lower gift tax rates. In the long
run, however, rate adjustment must be the only answer to the
Government's need and the taxpayer's demand for relief. Mean-
while, both equity and good practice would be best served by a
system which permits of a ready and certain answer.
At the present time only the venturesome counsellor would
deign to answer a client's query "What is a gift?" Were he to
ask the same question himself, he would be justified in emulating
the jesting Pilate, and turn aside without waiting for a reply.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss1/6
